RIGHT TO BE COUNSELED: THE EFFECT OF COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES ON THE STRICKLAND STANDARD
Paul Quincy*
INTRODUCTION
If life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are the pinnacle of the American Dream, then the ability to defend oneself from wrongful conviction and
incarceration is a vital component to protecting the dream. The Sixth
Amendment’s promise of the right to counsel in criminal defense is essential
to protecting Americans’ liberties. But increasingly, the Sixth Amendment
is necessary as an instrument of protection from non-incarcerative punishments—the ever-broadening world of collateral consequences.
“Collateral consequence” refers to any of the thousands of rights that can
be revoked alongside a criminal conviction1—from eligibility for elected office
in Alabama2 to the ability to form a nonprofit cooperative agriculture or livestock association in Wyoming.3 Specific defendants can face varied levels of
punishment based on the charges they face—an immigrant may face jail time
followed by automatic deportation while a citizen faces only jail time for the
same crime.4 The essential definition of collateral versus direct consequences
stems from the source of the punishment—whether civil or penal enforcement.5
*
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J.D. Candidate, 2018, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.S., 2013, Georgetown University.
Special thanks to Professor Malia Brink, who singlehandedly walked me through Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence and encouraged me to dig deeper into the hidden issues of criminal sentencing, and
to the Journal of Constitutional Law editors who poured over this article more times than I can count.
A recent survey, the National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of Conviction, estimates nearly
fifty thousand statutory collateral consequences throughout the United States’ federal and state
systems. See Search, JUST. CTR., https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/search/ (last visited Dec. 31,
2017) (indicating that the project has compiled 48,229 collateral state and federal law collateral
consequences in its database); see also Project Description, JUST. CTR., https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/description/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2017) (describing the National Inventory of Collateral
Consequences of Conviction).
ALA. CODE § 17-17-41 (West 2017) (declaring a candidate ineligible following a conviction of bribery or wrongfully attempting to influence a voter).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-10-103 (West 2017).
8 C.F.R. § 214.1(g) (2017).
Collateral consequences take effect through civil enforcement, not as a direct criminal punishment.
Deportation, therefore, is a collateral consequence. See I NVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15–16 (Mark Mauer & Meda ChesneyLind eds., 2002) [hereinafter INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT] (identifying collateral consequences as a
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Following the Supreme Court’s recognition that the Sixth Amendment
includes the right to effective counsel in Strickland v. Washington,6 the Court has
produced a long line of opinions defining the constitutional standard for adequate representations for criminal defendants.7 In producing these opinions,
the Court seems to have acknowledged a pragmatic—and perhaps moralist—
reality that the requirements of effective counsel are directly proportional to
the extent of the crime’s punishment. While the Court has in-depth discussion
regarding the requirements of counsel for death penalty defendants, it has
largely left counsel for misdemeanants without any effective standards.
With the proliferation of collateral consequences, the effective level of harm
from a misdemeanor conviction can steeply rise based on the defendant’s circumstances. By factoring in these collateral harms, the Strickland requirement
of effective counsel demands a higher level of interaction between client and
attorney. While the Court has not articulated tangible standards for effective
counsel in light of collateral punishment mechanisms, the implications of collateral consequences likely necessitate that—at a minimum—effective attorneys
communicate with their clients about both the possible collateral harms of a
guilty plea and the client’s concerns regarding non-incarcerative punishments.
I. THE SLIDING SCALE OF THE STRICKLAND STANDARD
The origins of the right to counsel demonstrate the effect of the level of
crime on the required amount of representation by a defense attorney. The
earliest recognition of a right to a defense attorney came from the most dire
circumstances—stranded, illiterate black men sentenced for group rape in a
racially-charged and mob-threatened courtroom within only days of indictment.8 Slowly the recognition of the right to counsel spread outward from
there, beginning with felonies before protecting misdemeanants. As it stands,
all criminal defendants within the United States that face incarceration for a
criminal offense have a right to counsel, regardless of the level of crime.9
The right to counsel, of course, means more than just having a licensed
attorney stand by the defendant when physically in court. The Supreme
Court recognized a functional requirement of the Sixth Amendment in Strick-
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type of “punishment” even though they are defined as “civil” rather than criminal).
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
See infra Part II.A.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 51 (1932).
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding that “absent a knowing and intelligent
waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or
felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
342 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel applies to state as well as
federal proceedings).
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land v. Washington, holding that the Sixth Amendment demands that all criminal defendants have “reasonably effective assistance” from their attorneys.10
Gideon’s and Strickland’s progeny establish the requirements of reasonable
counsel as a sort of sliding scale—with more severe punishments meriting
more significant time and effort from criminal defense attorneys.11
A review of the origins of the right to counsel and the different encompassed duties provides a useful context for why the right to effective counsel
is directly related to the level of criminality. The Supreme Court’s reliance
on professional norms and on pragmatic impacts of a reasonableness standard further cement the real-world application of the Strickland sliding scale.
Furthermore, this model suggests that consideration of collateral consequences may blur or abolish the distinction between required services for
misdemeanor and felony defenses.
A. The Origins of the Right to Counsel
The right to counsel was, itself, born out of the Court’s dealings with capital crimes and death penalty cases. In Powell v. Alabama, the Court recognized that the deplorable conditions under which the “Scottsboro boys”
faced trial constituted a violation of the Sixth Amendment.12 The Scottsboro
boys were nine young black men charged with rape of two white women,
while traveling through Scottsboro, Alabama.13 The Powell Court ruled narrowly in light of the egregious circumstances and partially applied the right
to counsel to state courts when the courts sees something as exceptional as a
“dumb, illiterate, and feeble-minded” defendant, sentenced to death, that
cannot afford counsel.14
The Court followed this line of protection in Betts v. Brady in 1942, which
affirmed that state courts must appoint counsel for indigent defendants, but
only when the defendant is “incapable adequately of making his own defense
because of ignorance, feeblemindedness, illiteracy, or the like.”15 Again, the
Court limited its opinion to the most offensive of circumstances—facing a
capital sentence without the protection of counsel. Although the Court
would later expand the protections of Powell and Betts to the point of near-
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466 U.S. at 687.
See infra notes 12–16.
Powell, 287 U.S. at 59.
Id. at 51; id. at 74 (Butler, J., dissenting) (“[N]ine defendants . . . were accused . . . .”).
Id. at 72. The Court did not wholly incorporate the Sixth Amendment to state courts for decades
to come. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (guaranteeing the right to trial in
state courts for non-petty crimes); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 (1966) (noting that the
“Sixth Amendment [is] made applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 463–64 (1942).
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redundancy, the origins of the nationwide right to counsel nonetheless
demonstrate the Court’s high premium on protections of counsel when a defendant faces a more exacting punishment for the crime.16
The right to counsel truly came of age with Gideon v. Wainwright, when the
Court affirmed the Sixth Amendment’s reach into both state and federal
court systems and expanded the right to counsel to noncapital crimes.17 In
Gideon, the Court rejected its previous standard from Betts and read the Sixth
Amendment to protect the right to counsel for all criminal defendants, regardless of severity of the crime or the defendant’s level of education.18 In
the unanimous opinion of the Court, Justice Black wrote that “certain fundamental rights” from the Bill of Rights apply equally to state and federal
protections through the Fourteenth Amendment, “among them the fundamental right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution.”19
Justice Black’s opinion managed to make no reference to any distinction between felonies, misdemeanors, or capital crimes in its holding.20 As a result,
the right to counsel outlined in Gideon expanded from Powell and Betts by including protection in all criminal proceedings, regardless of the level of punishment or whether charged in a federal or state court.21
B. Effective Counsel—Strickland and the Modern Sixth Amendment
The Gideon Court declined to answer whether the Sixth Amendment protects only the formalist right of a defendant to have an attorney’s nominal
availability or if there was a meaningful standard to what representation had
to entail for someone facing criminal conviction. In Strickland, the Court decided on the latter standard, holding that the Sixth Amendment provided for
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Cf. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159–60 (holding that the right to trial by jury in a state court applies to all
non-petty crimes but refusing to mandate the protection for lesser crimes).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963). The right to counsel for criminal defendants
already existed in the federal court system for decades. Johnston v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938),
recognized this protection only six years after Powell and four years before Betts. See id. at 463 (“The
Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel.”
(footnote omitted)).
See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342–44 (rejecting the logic of Betts in favor of broader Sixth Amendment
protection).
Id. at 343 (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243–44 (1936)).
Black’s only mentions of “felony” or “misdemeanor” come from his summary of the case’s facts and
reference to Betts. See id. at 336–37, 339. The opinion does not mention “capital crimes,” and that
term is used only once in Justice Clark’s opinion concurring in the result, referring to Betts. See id. at
348 (Clark, J., concurring in the result). None of these terms are mentioned in Black’s reasoning.
See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 (1972) (“Both Powell and Gideon involved felonies. But
their rationale has relevance to any criminal trial, where an accused is deprived of his liberty. Powell
and Gideon suggest that there are certain fundamental rights applicable to all such criminal
prosecutions . . . .”).
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more than just an attorney’s presence, but also some degree of effective representation—asking “whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”22 To make a successful Strickland claim, therefore,
a convicted claimant must show both (1) unreasonably ineffective representation by counsel and (2) that counsel’s incompetency prejudiced the court
against the claimant.23 While recognizing that the Sixth Amendment guarantees meaningful representation, Justice O’Connor’s opinion left the true
standard of the right to effective counsel vague, continuing the Fifth Circuit’s
reliance on “reasonably effective assistance” under the “totality of the circumstances.”24 Despite her reference to attorney performance balanced against
“prevailing professional norms,”25 the Strickland Court continued to give large
amounts of deference to attorneys’ decisions, including those of failing to investigate significant information, as within their strategic discretion.26
C. “Reasonably Effective Assistance”—Strickland’s Sliding Scale
The modern implications of Strickland, as they apply to non-felony representation, rely on a substantial amount of speculation without definitive guidance
by the Supreme Court. Without reservation, the Court has confirmed that the
right to effective counsel and the logic of Strickland apply to any criminal defense
case where there is a risk of criminal incarceration: “Both Powell and Gideon involved felonies. But their rationale has relevance to any criminal trial, where
an accused is deprived of his liberty.”27 In unambiguous language in Argersinger,
Justice Douglas described access to effective counsel as a constitutional prerequisite before incarceration: “[N]o imprisonment may be imposed, even though
local law permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel.”28
The Court’s determination that the right to counsel applies to all incarcerative charges is grounded in pragmatic concerns—that an individual can
lose his or her liberty as a result of the complications of the legal system—
rather than formalism regarding the conviction. For example, in Alabama v.
Shelton, the Court affirmed the Alabama court’s determination that the right
to counsel applies even in the case of suspended sentencing, when the incarceration is “not immediate or inevitable.”29
22
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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (“[T]he right to counsel is the right to the
effective assistance of counsel.” (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970))).
Id. at 687.
Id. at 680 (quoting Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1250 (5th Cir. 1982)).
Id. at 688.
Id. at 691.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 (1972).
Id. at 40.
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 659, 674 (2002).
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The Court’s continued reliance on pragmatic concerns, a reasonableness
standard, prevailing professional norms, and totality of circumstances in the
Strickland analysis suggests that Strickland’s standards vary based on the possible extent of punishment for the defendant. Accordingly, a defense attorney
must meet the most demanding levels of representation for a client facing
capital punishment, but the bar of “reasonably effective counsel” is much
lower for minor sentences.30
Although the right to counsel attaches to capital, felony, and misdemeanor cases, the Court has taken significantly more opportunities to address the right to effective counsel in capital cases, with fewer cases addressing
felonies and almost never speaking to requirements in misdemeanor defense.
Based on its history, the Court has implicitly demonstrated that the most significant Strickland violations occur in capital crimes, where Strickland’s requirements are highest, but the sliding scale of “reasonably effective counsel” creates a lesser bar in lower risk crimes like misdemeanors.
1. Death Penalty Defense
The highest threshold for criminal defense attorneys occurs in counsel’s
representation of clients facing the death penalty. Even before the Court firmly
established the right to counsel in Gideon, the right to counsel was borne out of
Powell, a capital case.31 The Powell Court required adequate representation for
the Scottsboro boys, which included the attorney’s ability to investigate circumstances around the client’s arrest and time to prepare an adequate defense.32 Several other previously mentioned foundational Sixth Amendment
cases, including Strickland, likewise pushed forward the protections from inadequate or nonexistent defense representation in death penalty cases.33
The Court upheld the need to perform some threshold of investigation for
death penalty defendants with Wiggins v. Smith34 and Rompilla v. Beard.35 In
Wiggins, the Court restated its reasonableness standard to the requirements of
investigation,36 and it relied on specified professional requirements of effective
30
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While the Court has never expressly accepted that Strickland’s reasonableness standard is actually a
variable formula, a combination of reliance on variable professional norms, pragmatic concessions,
and trends in the Court’s analysis demonstrate a real-world application of a variable formula.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 50, 73 (1932).
Id. at 58.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (recounting defense counsel’s arguments at
death penalty sentencing hearing); see also, e.g., Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 159–60 (1968).
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003).
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005).
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521 (“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 690–91)).
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representation in capital defense cases.37 Therefore, capital defense investigation requires, as a constitutional minimum, investigation into mitigation
factors in the defendant’s past, including “medical history, educational history, employment and training history, family and social history, prior adult
and juvenile correctional experience, and religious and cultural influences.”38
Likewise, in Rompilla, the Court reiterated the high bar of investigation
required for capital defense. A jury convicted Rompilla of a violent murder,
in which the victim was “stabbed repeatedly and set on fire.”39 The attorney
in Rompilla “failed to investigate ‘pretty obvious signs’” of childhood trauma,
mental illness, and alcoholism or even to search the publicly available files
that the prosecution declared they would rely on.40 Rompilla expanded Wiggins’s holding, requiring tangible efforts by criminal defense attorneys to investigate the defendant’s past and criminal record when defending the justice
system’s most punitive cases.41
By recognizing these finite standards, the Court defined specific needs for
death penalty defense attorneys to meet in any capital defense case, including
sentencing hearings. While the Court rarely proclaims tangible requirements of effective counsel, Wiggins and Rompilla offer examples of a Court
facing the possibility of underrepresentation in death penalty sentencing.
Given the high stakes and high levels of punishment, the Court therefore was
less reluctant to demand attorney actions than to allow condemning findings
to stand. By recognizing these tangible requirements, the Court also implicitly noted that the right to counsel demands the highest levels of representation in capital defense cases.
2. Felony Defense
The right to effective counsel, of course, extends beyond death penalty sentencing. Gideon itself was a felony case.42 However, the Court has not opted to
put the same hard lines onto felony defense that Rompilla and Wiggins evinced,
37
38
39
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Id. at 524 (citing GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES 11.4.1(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1989)).
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 11.8.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1989)).
Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 377.
Id. at 379.
Id. at 390. Although Rompilla still represents good law, it holds a peculiar position as one of the
closest cases in the Court’s history—Justice O’Connor wrote the opinion in Rompilla, and within
one year she had resigned from the Court and been replaced by Justice Alito, the writer of the
Third Circuit opinion that Rompilla overturned. See Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233, 235 (3d Cir.
2004); David Stout, Alito Resists Making Comparisons to O’Connor, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/12/politics/politicsspecial1/alito-resists-making-comparisons-to-oconnor.html.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 336–37 (1963).
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suggesting that the “reasonably effective” advocacy is a lower standard when the
death sentence is not on the line. Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s felony cases
require forms of representation that extend beyond mere advocacy in trial.43
While the “objective standard of reasonableness” still applies in felony
defense cases,44 the Court has not held the same level of requirement as in
capital defense cases. Instead, the Court has deferred to the prevailing norms
of the legal profession, as measured by professional organizations like the
American Bar Association.45
Appellate courts have proliferated some finite requirements of the duty
to investigate in non-capital felony cases. The Fourth Circuit, in United States
v. Mooney, held that there was a Sixth Amendment violation when an attorney
failed to investigate a viable affirmative defense to the client’s felony charge
of unlawful possession of a firearm.46 The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the
convicted felon when his attorney advised him to reject a plea deal for five
years’ incarceration47—advice which the court called “not only erroneous,
but egregious,” by failing to recognize that the defendant was subject to the
“three strikes law” and therefore eligible for a life sentence.48
The courts’ rulings in felony defense cases demonstrate continuing protections as a part of the reasonable performance of attorneys in felony defense
cases, as proportional to the level of punishment sought by the prosecution.
The reality that the Court does not go to the same efforts to protect alleged
felons from ineffective representation as in capital defense cases shows that
the Court is less willing to consider the obligations of felony defense as a high
constitutional threshold.
3. Misdemeanor Defense
While the right to counsel does extend to misdemeanor charges, there is little
definitive case law to define the scope of the Sixth Amendment’s substantive requirements. This continues the Court’s trend of being less willing to intervene
when it sees the “reasonableness” threshold to be lower as a result of the lower
associated punishments from conviction. Furthermore, by nature of the minor
incarcerative results of misdemeanor charges, the Supreme Court has had only
very brief opportunities to address adequacy of counsel for misdemeanants.
43
44
45
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47
48

See infra Part I.D for more on the right to counsel in peripheral criminal defense processes.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010).
See id. at 366–67 (citing to the ABA, National Legal Aid and Defender Association, the Department
of Justice’s Compendium of Standards for Indigent Defense Systems, and other determinants of
professional norms); see also infra Part I.E.
United States v. Mooney, 497 F.3d 397, 404, 409 (4th Cir. 2007).
Riggs v. Fairman, 399 F.3d 1179, 1183–84 (9th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, 430 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir.
2005), appeal dismissed on other grounds, No. 02-55185, 2006 WL 6903784 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1183.
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However, Gideon definitively still applies to misdemeanor sentences,49 and cases
challenging the effectiveness of counsel for misdemeanors still receive the Strickland two-prong analysis.50 Therefore, while some degree of protection still exists
under the right to effective counsel, the boundaries lack any tangible specific
guidance relative to those that risk more severe punishment.
The Court has only addressed effective counsel claims for misdemeanor
charges on two occasions. In Argersinger, the Supreme Court noted that the
right to counsel applies to any criminal case that involves a defendant facing
incarceration, even if for a misdemeanor.51 In Shelton, the Court confirmed
that Argersinger attaches the right to counsel to all cases involving criminal
detention, even if that detention is conditional or prospective.52
Without any specification that would limit Strickland to cases decided on
felony counts, it appears that the same duties of reasonable counsel extend
to misdemeanor cases as well. What is unclear, however, is the extent of the
obligation. For example, the Fourth Circuit in Mooney upheld a duty to investigate an affirmative defense to a felony charge of a previously convicted
felon possessing a firearm.53 There, the court held that Mooney’s attorney
had a duty to investigate the justification that Mooney had seized the firearm
from his ex-wife as she was attacking him with it only for him to surrender it
to the police.54 While the duty to investigate affirmative defenses reached
that far in the case of a felony charge, there is likely a duty to investigate to
only a lesser extent for a simple misdemeanor charge. Prevailing professional
norms, of course, are key in determining how much time, effort, and persistence a defense attorney would need to expend in searching for potential defenses—a threshold affirming that misdemeanors have lower reasonableness
requirements for defense attorneys.55
D. Effective Counsel Outside the Courtroom
In two of the Court’s landmark cases, the Court expanded the right to
counsel beyond simply investigation and courtroom advocacy. In Padilla v.
Kentucky and Missouri v. Frye, the majorities recognized the pragmatic needs of

49
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Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 (1972) (noting that the decision in Gideon suggests certain
fundamental rights apply to all criminal prosecutions “where an accused is deprived of his liberty”).
See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 314 n.157 (2011) (listing federal circuit and district court applications of
the Strickland test to misdemeanor charges).
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 32, 37.
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002).
United States v. Mooney, 497 F.3d 397, 404 (4th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 399, 404.
As discussed in Part I.E, professional guidance suggests that investigation into misdemeanors does
not have to be as searching as in felony cases.
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reasonably effective counsel require attorneys to provide some outside advisory
and consulting duties in key steps in the criminal defense process.56
When a collateral consequence is so severe as to blur the lines between
collateral and direct punishment, counsel has an obligation to advise his client about the potential or mandatory results of a guilty plea. One of the most
important modern cases in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence is Padilla, in
which the Court found inadequate representation when the attorney failed
to warn his client that a conviction would necessarily mean deportation.57
Although the Court refused to determine whether the deportation was a direct or a collateral consequence of conviction,58 the formal distinction between the two suggests that it would apply as a collateral consequence.59 Regardless, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, eventually concluded that
the punishment of automatic deportation was so significant that a reasonable
attorney would have to advise his client of the mandatory outcome of a guilty
plea.60 Anything less than clear advice, in the case of an explicit and clear
mandate for deportation, is a “deficiency” in counsel of Strickland proportions.61 The Court, therefore, requires counsel to advise their clients on severe collateral legal consequences of a guilty plea.62
When some aspect of the litigation process, inside or outside the courtroom,
is essential to the judicial system, the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to
communicate about it with his client. In Frye, the Court continued to hold that
an accused felon’s right to counsel can apply to essential litigation steps outside
the courtroom.63 Frye’s attorney failed to respond to plea deals or pass the offers
on to the defendant before they expired.64 Upon eventual appeal, Frye successfully argued that a failure to pass the plea bargains on prejudiced the entire
process and constituted a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.65 The Court
agreed that an attorney has a duty to pass plea offers on to his client as a natural
function of the plea bargain’s “central” role in the administration of justice.66

56
57
58
59
60
61
62

63
64
65
66

Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010).
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359, 374.
Id. at 366.
Collateral consequences take effect through civil enforcement, not as a direct criminal punishment.
See INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 5.
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368–69.
Id. at 369.
Because the Court refused to recognize Padilla as a retroactive right, there have been very few opportunities to apply it to habeas proceedings in federal court in the few years since Padilla was
handed down. See Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107 (2013) (holding Padilla is a nonretroactive rule). However, the potential exploration under Padilla is likely to fill in several of the
gaps left in how to effectuate the precedent..
See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (stating that the Sixth Amendment applies to the
plea bargain process).
Id. at 138–39.
Id. at 139–40.
Id. at 143.
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Per the Court’s dual precedents of Padilla and Frye, effective counsel is not
limited to activity inside the courtroom or to a duty to investigate. Instead,
defense representation must provide effective counsel at all central steps of
the criminal defense process, including learning about and understanding the
possible implications of some collateral consequences that a guilty verdict or
plea could trigger.
E. Role of ABA Guidance
Most compellingly demonstrating the Court’s application of a sliding scale
is the Court’s reliance on professional standards, which show different expectations for attorney action based on the severity of the charge. In her article
examining Strickland’s standards for misdemeanants, Professor Jenny Roberts
discusses the expectations for counsel’s level of care in criminal defense:
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s emphatic reliance on professional standards in recent ineffective assistance jurisprudence, an institutional defender
office or an attorney new to criminal practice might reasonably turn to published professional standards for guidance on representation in misdemeanor
cases. That attorney will find different defender caseload recommendations
for felonies and misdemeanors. That attorney may also find different levels
of compensation for felony and misdemeanor representation in her jurisdiction, which suggests different expectations for felony and misdemeanor representation.67

For example, the American Bar Association has adopted the guidelines of
the National Advisory Commission (“NAC”) on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals for attorney caseload maximums.68 The NAC standards recommend no more than 150 felony defense cases per attorney per year, but concedes a higher total of 400 as a cap for misdemeanor defense cases.69 Professor Roberts also indicates the heightened pay grade for felony defense
attorneys than their misdemeanor counterparts,70 while felony and capital
defense attorneys typically also have a higher degree of expertise as well.71

67
68

69
70
71

Roberts, supra note 50, at 326–27 (footnotes omitted).
See TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 4 n.2, 5 n.19 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002)
[hereinafter ABA TEN PRINCIPLES] (indicating conformance with NAC Standard 13.12, including
a maximum attorney caseload recommendation of 150 felonies per year or 400 misdemeanors per
year).
Id. at 5 n.19.
Roberts, supra note 50, at 326–27, 327 n.214.
See id. at 363 (noting that the ABA’s Ten Principles imply “that there are certain classes of cases that
require a certain level of experience and expertise,” such as “cases that carry significant potential
prison—or death—sentences”). Generally, public defenders start on misdemeanor cases before working their way up to felony defense and then possibly to capital defense. See id. at 303, 305, 364 (remarking that “new attorneys” often begin their practice with misdemeanor cases); see also id. at 326–27
(explaining that a new attorney might “reasonably turn to published professional standards for guidance” and that when she does, she will find different recommendations based on the level of offense).
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The Court widely cites the ABA and other professional organizations as
useful guides to determine prevailing professional norms.72 However, the
Court has fluctuated on the extent of its reliance on the ABA as a promulgator of professional norms—ranging from using ABA guidelines as the “standards for capital defense work”73 to “guides . . . [but] they are only guides.”74
Exactly how definitive ABA guidelines are remains unclear, since full deference to the ABA would allow the organization the ability to define constitutional norms without oversight.75 Nonetheless, the Court continues to reference them as an essential benchmark in how reasonably attorneys must act.
Professor Roberts cites to the Court’s reliance on the ABA’s and other
professional organizations’ guidelines as evidence that attorneys’ duties in
service of criminal defendants must rise and fall proportionately to the level
of punishment for the accused crime.76 Her interpretation of the Court’s
sliding scale accords with the model examined above—higher punishment
crimes require more care, effort, and counsel from defense attorneys.
Most consequentially, the Court itself referenced the amount of harm as
applicable to Strickland’s requirement of reasonable assistance of counsel. In
demurring from defining a clear rule of whether direct or indirect punishments can influence the requirements of Strickland, the Padilla Court noted that
the extent of punishment is vital to “define the scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance’ required under Strickland.”77 By accepting the
extent of punishment as a definitive factor in the requirements of the right to
counsel, the Court implicitly adopted Professor Roberts’ analysis, and by extension the analysis above, to adopt Strickland as an adaptive requirement.
II. CLIENT-SPECIFICITY—EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
“When the deprivation of property rights and interests is of sufficient
consequence, denying the assistance of counsel . . . is a denial of due process.”78
Justice Powell, in his concurrence in Argersinger, noted the interplay between
72
73
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See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 367 (2010) (citing the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association, Department of Justice, and journal and treatise guidelines for effective aid).
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
See id. at 688–89 (stating that a “particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct . . . would
interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel”).
See Roberts, supra note 50, at 326–27 (observing that there are “different expectations for felony and
misdemeanor representation” under current professional guidelines); supra text accompanying note
67 (stating the same); see also ABA TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 68, at 5 n.19 (noting that an attorney
may take on at the most 400 misdemeanors and 150 felonies per year).
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring in the result) (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted).
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collateral consequences and the variable requirements of Strickland.79 Greater
punitive harms, whether direct or collateral, require greater obligations of
defense counsel.
The right to effective counsel should mandate that defense attorneys discuss the possible implications of collateral consequences with their clients.
This requirement stems from Padilla’s required consideration of all punitive
harms, not merely incarcerative ones,80 as well as Frye’s rule that the Sixth
Amendment covers vital stages of defense even outside the courtroom.81
While the exact extent of the right to effective counsel may vary along with
the amount of punishment, a defense attorney must assess (1) the applicability
of the collateral consequences to the client and (2) the client’s comparative
interests in avoiding incarcerative or non-incarcerative punishments. Only
after this conversation can an attorney assess the level of punishment and
provide the appropriate Strickland level effective assistance.
To demonstrate this conclusion, we must first recognize that, in terms of
Strickland’s sliding scale, misdemeanors with significant collateral harms merit
more in-depth care than previous analysis has suggested. Padilla states that
the consideration of additional, collateral harms affects the total harm of a
conviction and therefore increases the amount of care a reasonably effective
attorney would provide.82 But, buried in Padilla, there is a second step: some
implicit analysis of the nature of the collateral consequence—whether punitive or pragmatic—that may prove a useful distinction for courts in determining Padilla’s effect on Strickland.83 Following the second step, effective
counsel must, at the very least, discuss and be prepared to weigh the effects
of punitive collateral consequences as they apply to the client, whether on
felony or misdemeanor charges.
A. Which Consequences Should Attorneys Consider?
One of the many monumental pillars created by Padilla is the majority’s
discussion of collateral consequences. Justice Stevens’s majority addressed
automatic deportation, though not a criminal punishment in the historic
Sixth Amendment context of incarceration, as “uniquely difficult to classify
as either a direct or a collateral consequence.”84 Although the Court did not
ultimately address the larger world of collateral consequences, the ruling did
79
80
81
82
83
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Id.; see also id. at n.11 (listing several collateral consequences as included in “property rights and
interests”).
See infra Part II.A.1.
See supra Part I.D.
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364–65, 373.
See id. at 365–66 (explaining that though deportation proceedings are civil, deportation is a penalty
closely tied to criminal conviction).
Id. at 360, 366.
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establish that punitive actions are an integral part of Strickland’s effective
counsel analysis.85 Justice Alito, in concurrence, suggested similar consequences that would merit additional scrutiny under the Padilla standard, albeit while rejecting large portions of Stevens’ opinion.86 Among these comparable collateral consequences, Justice Alito included “civil commitment,
civil forfeiture, the loss of the right to vote, disqualification from public benefits, ineligibility to possess firearms, dishonorable discharge from the Armed
Forces, and loss of business or professional licenses.”87 In doing so, Justice
Alito recognized the implications of Padilla, if unchecked, could reach further
than merely the narrowest reading in deportation cases. However, Justice
Alito’s concurrence also raised a significant question in collateral consequence defense: Which collateral consequences should Strickland factor in?
1. Punitive Versus Pragmatic Collateral Consequences
Padilla recognized deportation as something a defense attorney must discuss with the defendant because of deportation’s punitive nature.88 Justice
Stevens, in writing the opinion, explicitly refused to state whether direct and
collateral forms of punishment merit equal consideration in the Strickland
analysis.89 However, he nonetheless included deportation as a relevant harm
to the defendant because the American legal system has “long recognized
that deportation is a particularly severe ‘penalty.’”90 The Court adopted deportation harms as relevant to reasonable assistance of counsel because, although “it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction,” convicted noncitizens
see deportation as a punitive outcome.91 In subsequently discussing this divide, the Court has stated that “the severity of the penalty and the ‘automatic’
way it follows from conviction” are the relevant factors to whether the consequences merit Strickland scrutiny.92
The Court therefore relies on a distinction within the broad scope of collateral consequences—those which have punitive outcomes versus those
which exist for social protection. Although not always a clear line, many
85
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Id. at 365–66, 369. Stevens suggests that a punitive intent, rather than mere pragmatic concerns,
may be a distinctive consideration for when a collateral consequence is relevant to a Strickland analysis. Id. at 365–66 (explaining that deportation merits special scrutiny “because of its close connection to the criminal process”).
Id. at 375–77 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 376.
Id. at 365, 374 (majority opinion) (discussing deportation as “a particularly severe ‘penalty’” (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893))).
Id. at 365.
Id. at 365–66 (quoting Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 740).
Id.
Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1111–12 (2013) (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366) (rejecting that Padilla stood for a complete eradication of the “direct-collateral” distinction).
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collateral consequences can be seen as promulgated for one of these two purposes, and therefore they apply to a different extent in a Strickland analysis.
Deportation, for example, is one of the most obvious examples of a punitive consequence. The goal of instituting automatic or discretionary deportation proceedings for a noncitizen convict is to deter crime.93 Criminal deportation generally falls into the deterrence theory of punishment because
the enhanced punishment would scare potential criminals by sanctioning
criminal action to a greater extent.94 On the other hand, criminal deportation serves little non-retributive purpose in protecting society. Crime rates
for noncitizens are significantly lower than those of citizens in the United
States.95 Recidivism rates among noncitizens are lower than recidivism for
U.S. citizens, so the threat to social safety by post-incarceration noncitizens
is lower than that of citizens.96 Because of its punitive role, the Court factored
deportation, a punitive collateral consequence, into the Strickland formula.
Some collateral consequences grow instead from a social protection interest. A typical example is that sex offenders cannot work in public schools
based on certain crimes. Alaska has a mandatory ban on certifying teachers
with previous sexual offense convictions involving a minor.97 Similar statutes
exist in other jurisdictions, including California98 and Vermont,99 with parallels in some federal education programs as well.100 The purpose of statutes
like these is clearly not a punitive one—there is little deterrent potential in
prohibiting future employment at a public school relative to the much larger
deterrent impacts of criminal sentences. Collateral consequences like these
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Anita Ortiz Maddali, Padilla v. Kentucky: A New Chapter in Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Whether
Deportation Constitutes Punishment for Lawful Permanent Residents?, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 43 (2011).
Id.
Richard Pérez-Peña, Contrary to Trump’s Claims, Immigrants Are Less Likely to Commit Crimes, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/us/trump-illegal-immigrants-crime.html.
Peter H. Schuck, Immigrant Criminals in Overcrowded Prisons: Rethinking an Anachronistic Policy, 27 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 597, 600 n.12 (2013) (noting a 1995 study showing that recidivism for noncitizens was
17.1% compared to 22.8% for U.S. citizens). However, the effect of deportation on these data is unclear.
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 14.20.020(f) (West 2017) (“The department may not issue a teacher certificate to a person who has been convicted of a crime . . . involving a minor under [sexual offense
statutes] . . . .”).
If an employment applicant for a child-care position has a previous guilty or nolo contendere plea or
conviction for a violent crime or sexual offense, the California state government must deny their application. While many crimes have some waiver potential, this waiver is prohibited for sexual offenses.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 101170(k)(1) (2017), WL 22 CCR § 101170(m) (citing CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1596.871(b) (West 2017)) (prohibiting waiver for sexual offense convictions).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 255(i) (West 2017) (“A person convicted of a sex offense that requires
registration . . . shall not be eligible for employment [in public or independent schools].”).
29 U.S.C. § 3195(b)(3) (2012) (barring any applicant for the Job Corps (a federal vocational training
program) from approval if the mandatory background check shows a conviction for “child abuse,
or a crime involving rape or sexual assault”).
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fall into the bucket of utilitarian or social protection punishments—pragmatic punishments that potentially or automatically preclude convicted
criminals from high risk activities. Other similar collateral consequences include bans on elected office from people previously convicted of bribery or
crimes of moral turpitude101 or abridging firearm ownership rights for people
convicted of violent felonies.102
Collateral consequences of this pragmatic or social welfare nature may
not fit into the Strickland scale because of Padilla’s inclusion of collateral consequences posed as a penalty. Justice Stevens’ opinion hinted that non-punitive collateral consequences are not factors in determining the required extent of reasonably effective counsel.103 Furthermore, Justice Alito’s concurrence
listed pragmatic collateral consequences as an example of the Padilla majority’s logic ad absurdum.104
The harder questions arise when a collateral consequence doesn’t easily
fit into either category—that of wholly punitive or wholly pragmatic. An
example might be the loss of access to welfare based on a criminal record,105
which serves the dual purposes of further penalizing criminal conduct while
also trying to cut down on the risk that public funds could be used inappropriately. In addressing these questions, the Sixth Amendment would then
require consideration only of the extent of a consequence’s punitive aspects.
On the other hand, the non-punitive, social welfare aspects of the collateral
consequence wouldn’t be pertinent to the Strickland analysis of what the Sixth
Amendment requires. Either way, to assess the punitive extent of a consequence on a defendant, defense counsel must have a preliminary discussion
with her client or risk providing inadequate assistance in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights.
2. Discretionary Versus Mandatory Collateral Consequences
Padilla expanded the scope of Strickland obligations as they pertained to a
client facing mandatory deportation. The Court did not, however, discuss
the obligations in light of mandatory or discretionary harms. Instead, the
discussion of the Court may suggest that Strickland considerations would be
based on the amount of risk of the collateral harm, which would again treat the
issue as a spectrum, with mandatory consequences at the 100% level of risk.

101
102
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See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-17-41 (West 2017) (barring a public official, once convicted of meddling
in an election, from taking office as a result of that election).
See, e.g., id. § 13A-11-72(a) (prohibiting persons convicted of crimes of violence from legally obtaining
or possessing a firearm).
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S 356, 364–66 (2010).
Id. at 376–77 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
See, e.g., WYO. STAT . ANN. § 42-2-112(n) (West 2017) (denying welfare to individuals who do not
comply with statutory requirements).
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The Court’s subsequent discussion of Padilla in Chaidez confirms the importance of the mandatory-discretionary distinction as a factor of consideration in the Strickland framework.
The closest Supreme Court discussion in Padilla to address mandatory
versus discretionary punishments comes in Justice Stevens’ discussion about
the risks of the attorney misreading the law on mandatory enforcement:
There will, therefore, undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain. The
duty of the private practitioner in such cases is more limited. When the law
is not succinct and straightforward . . . , a criminal defense attorney need do
no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may
carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences. But when the deportation
consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.106

In this excerpt, Justice Stevens discusses the risk that the law requires deportation, in light of an individual attorney being unable to predict legal outcomes
with precise foresight.107 Nonetheless, the text also describes the same balance
of risk and harm that discretionary collateral consequences carry. In this alternate reading, “consequences” are still “unclear or uncertain”—not because the
“law can be complex” but because discretionary outcomes cannot be predicted.108 When there is a risk of a punitive consequence, Stevens notes, there
is an obligation to disclose the risk.109 And when there is a risk, the “possibility
of [punishment] . . . will affect the scope and nature of counsel’s advice.”110
However, the Court later reexamined the extent of Padilla in Chaidez, a
case that noted that the “automatic” nature of the deportation in Padilla was
a necessary component in the Court’s determination.111
Given Padilla’s discussion of risk and Chaidez’s discussion of the automatic
nature of deportation, the Court’s dividing line likely still accords with a
model based on likely punitive harms, rather than a strict adherence to the
mandatory-discretionary boundary.
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Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369 (majority opinion) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 369, 369 n.10 (referencing Justice Alito’s concurrence and his concern that the majority’s
opinion would hold all criminal defense attorneys to the standard of specialists in immigration law
and policy); see also id. at 387–88 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[A] criminal defense attorney should not be required to provide advice on immigration law, a complex specialty that generally lies outside the scope of a criminal defense attorney’s expertise.”).
Id. at 369 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 369 n.10.
Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1112 (2013) (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366).
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B. Client-Specific Impacts and Priorities of Collateral Consequences
Collateral consequences vary significantly between jurisdictions, and can
touch on a broad array of aspects of a defendant’s life. In Pennsylvania, for
example, there are fifty different automatic collateral consequences that are
triggered by various misdemeanor convictions, including forfeit of retirement
benefits for public employees,112 loss of jury privileges,113 juvenile transfer to
alternate education programs,114 ineligibility for public welfare until all terms
served,115 and immediately having to leave public office.116 Any of these different consequences would affect defendants very differently based on the
defendants’ personal circumstances.
In analyzing the impact of collateral consequences, the Strickland standard
requires consideration of the weight or effect of each of these harms on the
individual defendant. For example, although the threat of mandatory deportation poses little concern to a natural-born U.S. citizen, the Court recognizes
that “[p]reserving the [immigrant] client’s right to remain in the United States
may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence.”117
At this point, it may be more helpful to discuss a hypothetical defendant—George. George is a noncitizen who lives in the United States, working
as a taxi cab driver. Although he works hard, George barely can support his
family, who also lives in the U.S. with him in public housing. One day,
George is arrested and charged with several misdemeanor crimes—domestic
abuse against his wife, followed by public intoxication and driving under the
influence. The alleged events also contain elements of sexual assault. Asserting his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney, George gets appointed counsel—a local public defender named Rachel from a very busy office. Rachel
must vigorously advocate for George’s interests, but also she has hundreds, if
not thousands, of other cases crossing her desk in any given year. So what
obligations does Rachel have to her client, George, under the Sixth Amendment? The Strickland scale would be informative, but only once we know the
true extent of punishment George faces.
This leads Rachel to two key steps—though they don’t need to be performed in any specific order. One, after seeing the charges brought forth by
the prosecution, Rachel should look at the related collateral consequences that
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43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1313(a) (West 2017).
42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4502(a) (West 2017).
24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 21-2134(a), (d) (West 2017).
62 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 432(9) (West 2017).
65 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 121 (West 2017).
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368 (2010) (first alteration in original) (quoting Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001), superseded by statute, REAL ID Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302).
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can harm her client.118 Here the charges are misdemeanors, but they potentially include domestic abuse. As Rachel is aware, a noncitizen who pleads
guilty to or is convicted of a domestic abuse charge is subject to automatic deportation.119 For his DUI charge, George could lose his taxi license.120 For
any of these crimes, George could lose his eligibility for public housing.121
Other collateral consequences may also apply, based on George’s history
and specific circumstances. This gives rise to Rachel’s other step—to adequately provide for George’s representation, Rachel needs to have a discussion with him regarding both the applicability of collateral consequences to
his life and his relative concerns between collateral and direct punishments.
To be able to adequately advocate for her client, Rachel needs to know what
her client most wants to avoid. Anything less would risk subjecting her client
to a significant punishment that lies against his interests. Here, George may
be willing to plead guilty to the two alcohol-related crimes to avoid the automatic deportation aspects of the domestic violence charge. Depending on
his attachment to his job, he may be more willing to risk deportation by going
to trial unless he can also plead around the DUI. But all of this is subject to
both George’s individual history and personal preferences. His attorney
needs to know these things to be able to represent his interests.
Further enforcing the need to have this conversation is the logic underlying
Padilla—that counsel has a responsibility to tell her client about significant punitive collateral risks122—and that of Frye—that the Sixth Amendment includes
non-litigation obligations that are central to the criminal justice system.123
Finally, these discussions with George are essential because they allow
Rachel to understand exactly how much a reasonable attorney should do to
protect her client. If Rachel was unaware of George’s backstory,124 as pertinent to collateral consequences, she might only prioritize her time such that
118
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A single jurisdiction can have immense numbers of collateral consequences for various crimes, some
mandatory and some discretionary. Without an independent entity turning these into a single database, the demand on Rachel’s time to research this could threaten to drown her. Fortunately,
the Department of Justice has already funded the creation of this database under the Council of
State Governments’ Justice Center. See Nat’l Inventory Collateral Consequences Conviction, JUST. CTR.,
COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS, https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org (last visited Jan. 10, 2018).
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) (2012).
See, e.g., 52 PA. CODE § 30.76(d)(3) (2017), WL 52 Pa. Code § 30.76 (requiring mandatory loss of
taxi driver certificate for drunk driving convictions if driving the taxi while under the influence).
42 U.S.C. § 13661(c) (2012) (allowing public housing officials discretionary authority to deny admission to convicted people who may threaten the health or safety of other residents).
See supra Part II.A.1.
See supra Part I.D.
This hypothetical does take advantage of over-simplification, of course. In a real proceeding, even a
time-strapped Public Defenders’ Office would likely note George’s citizenship status and profession
in the most preliminary intake procedure. However, these offices may not also include other pertinent information. See, e.g., Office of the Pub. Def., Northampton Cty. Gov’t, Public Defender Application 1–2 (2018), https://www.northamptoncounty.org/PUBDEF/Documents/Application%
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she represents him with an unconstitutionally low amount of her time. While
the loss of taxi driving permission likely wouldn’t contribute to the Strickland
analysis because of its presumably pragmatic basis, the potential loss of public
housing access might have some effect on Rachel’s obligations. Once she
knows that her client faces deportation, certainly, the increased punitive outcome from the proceedings require her to advocate more vigorously along
the Strickland standard.125 Based on this information, Rachel can opt how to
negotiate a plea bargain or proceed to trial. In a likely outcome, George may
have to plead guilty to one or both of the alcohol-related charges, but doing
so would allow him to stay in the United States, perhaps after only a fine and
rehabilitation requirements.
This hypothetical demonstrates the oversimplification in wholesale reliance on the ABA maximums based on the felony/misdemeanor distinction.
Under the minimal interpretation suggested by ABA standards, Rachel could
ethically represent four hundred Georges in a year—an average of five hours
per client in a two-thousand-hour work year. In those five hours, Rachel
must acquaint herself with the client, assess the accusations, perform reasonable background investigations, receive and assess plea deals, and keep the
client involved abreast of all vital stages of the litigation. On the other hand,
one of Rachel’s peers could handle four hundred alleged misdemeanants, all
U.S. citizens in private housing and with job security unaffected by criminal
records. Each of these defendants would get the same average of five hours
of attorney representation, regardless of the applicability of collateral consequences, because they are all misdemeanants in the ABA guidelines.
However, if we hypothesize that all four hundred of Rachel’s clients face
automatic deportation if she cannot find the time to vigorously defend their
rights—adequately learn the facts of their case, realize that the defendants
face this form of punitive harm, create a plea-bargaining strategy to avoid
mandatory deportation, and leverage this preparation in negotiations with
the prosecution—they will each face deportation. As a matter of ethical concern, “reasonable professional assistance” should be a more demanding constitutional baseline when the nature of the harm contains the kind of punitive
collateral consequences that Padilla addresses.
Based on the Court’s evolving discussion on the right to counsel and the
impact of collateral consequences, assessing the punitive effect of collateral
consequences on the client is a constitutional obligation both for determining
the client’s needs in the proceedings and for assessing the constitutional floor
of adequacy of counsel. These professional obligations derive not only from
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20for%20Public%20Defender.pdf. While a cursory review could take the place of the first step
described above, counsel must still have a discussion regarding the risks and priorities that the defendant needs personally.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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an ethical obligation to adequately represent one’s clients, but also from the
reasonableness requirements of Strickland and the more holistic advocacy interpretations of Padilla and Frye.
III. TANGIBLE REQUIREMENTS OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Because of the varying effects of collateral consequences on defendants,
defense counsel must discuss possibly applicable punitive consequences with
the client to ascertain (1) the risks to the client of a conviction or guilty plea
and (2) the client’s relative concerns in facing incarcerative or non-incarcerative punishments. Only after this conversation can an attorney be sure to
provide the client with sufficient representation under the Sixth Amendment’s requirements and ensure that she advocates the client’s true interests.
A. Relative Importance of Collateral Consequences—A “Reverse” Strickland Sliding
Scale?
The above requirements may not apply in the most highly punitive cases,
since these conversations are only applicable in assessing significant impacts
of collateral consequences on the total amount of punishment. Despite the
importance of determining a baseline of sufficient representation, the pragmatic requirements of defining effective assistance may include the reality that
higher levels of incarcerative punishments would mean that collateral consequences wouldn’t make a significant impact on the needs of Strickland advocacy. Put this into the most far-reaching example: A client facing the death
penalty wouldn’t want his attorney to be preoccupied by whether he might
lose the ability to run for local government office someday. Applying this
“reverse sliding scale” analysis is a logical offshoot of both the need of the
attorney to consider the relative harms of punishments as well as the reality
that higher-level crimes already merit more rigorous defense representation
than misdemeanor defense.
While the Strickland sliding scale appears to suggest that attorneys must put
more effort to defend their felony or capital case clients, the effect of collateral
consequences on effective counsel’s requirements may actually decrease relative
to the level of criminality. As a result, the pragmatic consideration of collateral consequences may only make an impact on criminal representation in
misdemeanor cases or, in extreme circumstances, some felony charges.
Throughout effective counsel jurisprudence, courts reference back to reasonableness and prevailing professional standards.126 In the Strickland sliding
scale model, pragmatism and reasonableness define the requirements of attorney actions. In the case of significant incarcerative punishments, the result
126

See supra Part I.C.
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may be a reasonable presumption that collateral consequences will not be
significant factors in the defendant’s decision-making process. This accords
with Frye’s determination that ineffective counsel claims can also be upheld
even when a defendant is removed from the “central” stages of prosecution127—when comparing minor collateral consequences to major incarcerative terms, pleading around minor potential collateral consequences certainly can become non-central to the proceedings.
Considering the potential implications of this theory, it would mean that
there are constitutional requirements under Strickland that would impact misdemeanor cases and some lesser felony cases without as much impact at the
highest levels of criminality. In Padilla, the Court affirmed the need to discuss
collateral consequences in a felony drug distribution case with one of the
most significant consequences—mandatory deportation.128 The presumptive relevance of collateral consequences might decrease in felony cases,
where the direct punishments are generally far more significant. In felony
cases, therefore, it would make sense that a defense attorney may only need
to perform cursory examinations of potential collateral consequences to focus
exclusively on the harshest collateral effects. Put simply—losing a driver’s
license is probably not as an important of a concern for someone facing a life
sentence as it would be for someone facing parole.
In a misdemeanor, however, the presumptive relative importance of collateral consequences is much higher, as a single guilty plea can affect thousands of collateral consequences while risking only a few days in jail. This
would mean that examination of potential collateral consequences would
have to be much more searching than in the field of felony defense, since the
relative importance of minor collateral consequences is higher.
The issue of defining a “presumptive” relative interest is a potentially
thorny matter. When can the court system or an attorney presume to know
that any reasonable client would be more concerned about incarceration
than threats to access to government benefits? To housing? To child custody? Complicating matters further is the prospective applicability of many
collateral consequences—how can this formula consider a misdemeanant’s
hopes of future political aspirations?
Given the Court’s history of deference to attorney discretion, it is possible
that this standard would be a highly pro-attorney one. On the other hand,
the Court may opt to hold information-sharing to a high standard, given the
high interests of a criminal defendant in being able to rely on her attorney to
advocate for their interests vigorously. After all, the defendant’s liberty is at
risk, and the attorney has a professional and constitutional obligation to advise her client of central litigative steps.
127
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Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143, 145 (2012).
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368–69 (2010).
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Without more guidance by the Court on these matters, it is unclear whether
there would be a pro-defendant or pro-attorney presumption; indeed, whether
there could be a presumption at all is another issue never addressed by the Supreme Court’s supervision. But the existence of a presumption is likely both as
a pragmatic limitation on the obligations of counsel and as a realistic understanding of what criminal defendants want their attorneys to focus on.
B. What Does Effective Collateral Consequence Counseling Look Like in Practice?
Just as the Court has given little direct guidance on the standards of Frye
and Padilla in collateral consequence advocacy, there is little to no guidance
on how to actually advise clients on collateral consequences. Certainly the
Constitution wouldn’t require overworked public defenders to talk through
every potential collateral consequence with every defendant who gets pushed
through their doors. Instead, we once again can consider pragmatic needs
and functional realities to determine how Strickland manifests in the realm of
collateral consequence advocacy. As previously noted, “reasonable” advocacy may be subject to some limiting principle of presmptive importance,
based on factors like potential harms and likelihood of applicability. Some
collateral harms are more likely applicable than others—a criminal defendant is more likely to be concerned about access to government benefits like
housing or welfare than the ability to form a nonprofit livestock co-op.
Some of these most general issues can be addressed by a simple intake
questionnaire, asking about clients’ need for government benefits, pending
child custody issues, or plans to use government loans for education, for example. This model is currently being explored by the San Francisco Public
Defender’s Office, examining the usefulness of questionnaires in several areas
of criminal defense.129 Among these questionnaires, the San Francisco Public
Defender’s Office has released examples of questionnaires to ensure end-toend client testimony preparation, establish evidence chains-of-custody, or
clarify eyewitness records.130 While the office has not published an intake
questionnaire, the office advocates checklists for some of the same reasons that
one would benefit from collateral consequence awareness—enhanced thoroughness, reliability, and efficiency.
Recall, however, that collateral consequences could introduce two requirements on effective advocacy—the representing attorney must ascertain
(1) the risks to the client of a conviction or guilty plea and (2) the client’s
relative concerns in facing incarcerative or non-incarcerative punishments.
While an intake questionnaire consisting of a simple series of checkboxes
might constitute a reasonable investigation into the first prong (along with
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See generally Jeff Adachi, Using Checklists to Improve Case Outcomes, CHAMPION, Jan.–Feb. 2015, at 30.
Id.
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the help of a collateral consequences database to determine applicability), the
attorney would still be obliged to meet with the client to address relative concerns about incarcerative and non-incarcerative punishments. Additionally,
Padilla and Frye still represent the requirements of counsel informing the client of these potential risks when significantly impactful, a task that likely requires some form of personal discussion.
CONCLUSION
Strickland represented the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement that fair
criminal prosecution cannot take place without the effective assistance of defense counsel. As a constitutional principle, criminal defendants need effective attorneys to protect their rights from abuse by the prosecutorial side of
criminal justice. Although protections of the Sixth Amendment are slow to
be recognized, the Court has nonetheless recognized that protections must be
reasonable and commensurate with prevailing professional norms—resulting
in the birth of a proportional defense measure in the Strickland sliding scale.
The Strickland sliding scale faced significant changes after the Supreme
Court’s rulings in Padilla and Frye, which suggested a significant pragmatic
bend in the previous determinations of effective client representation.
Among these impacts is the requirement that collateral consequences, when
both punitive and sufficiently central to criminal defense proceedings, are
factored into Strickland evaluations.
Looking into these considerations, the bare minimum requirement of collateral consequence advocacy is that attorneys take the time to ascertain the
potential application of these harms to their clients, as well as the client’s
relative concerns about incarcerative versus collateral punishments. Without
significant further guidance by the Court, it is hard to understand more of
what this model might require, but it is clear that effective counsel requires,
at the very least, attorneys who are sufficiently informed of the potential punitive minefield of collateral consequences in defending their clients.

